"The Lost Platoon - Part 2"*
*
Date: 14th November 1965*
*
Time: 15:25*  
*
*
Mission type: USA extremely cautious advance to pre-defined objectives*
*
NVA Units/Formations present on map: 187/65 *
*
Map size: Huge (160 x 200)*
*
Visibility: 10*
*
Turns: 31*
*
*
*
Lt. Col Hal Moore's After Action Report :*
*
D. THE 2ND ATTACK TO REACH THE SURROUNDED 2D PLATOON COMPANY B:*
* 
(1) The time was now approximately 1545 hours and the 
disposition of the opposing forces was as shown at Tab G. The first 
attempt by Companies A and B to reach the cut-off platoon had been 
stopped by approximately 300 enemy. We were taking moderate casualties 
especially among leaders and radiomen. These enemy were aggressive 
and they came off the mountain in large groups. They were well- 
camouflaged and took excellent advantage of cover and concealment. They 
were good shots. They were armed with numerous automatic weapons and 
small "potato-masher" grenades. Even after being hit several times in 
the chest, many continued firing and moving for several more steps before 
dropping dead. I ordered Companies A and B to evacuate their casualties; 
withdraw under covering fires out of close contact; and prepared for a 
coordinated attack supported by heavy preparatory fires to get back the 
surrounded platoon. Meanwhile Company C was continuing to hold off the 
enemy to their front with the help of some magnificent artillery and 
close air support. The Battalion S-2 was wounded and later shot again 
and killed during this enemy attack. The surrounded platoon of B 
Company stood off numerous PAVN efforts to overrun it. Carrying their 
dead, their wounded, and their equipment the men of the platoon estab- 
lished a small 25 meter wide perimeter on a slight rise of ground and 
redistributed their ammunition under heavy enemy fire.*
* 
(2) At approximately 1620 hours, the second attack by 
Companies A and B to reach the surrounded platoon began. This attack 
was preceded by artillery and ARA preparatory fires. Between the first 
and second attacks and despite heavy fires from artillery and air, the 
enemy had moved well up towards A and B Companies. Some were in trees. 
None fell back, for friendly to advance, the enemy had to be killed. 
This was difficult because they were well-camouflaged and used all 
means of cover and concealment. Many had dug into small spider-holes, 
others were dug into the tops and sides of the ant-hills. By that 
time, Company A had lost all three rifle platoon leaders - one KIA and 
its artillery forward observer KIA. Four men had been shot and killed 
within six feet of the Company Commander, including his commo sergeant 
who was acting as a radio operator. Company B echeloned slightly 
ahead and to the right of Company A, progressed only 75 - 100 meters 
much of it paid for in close-in fighting. I had given A Company 
back his platoon which had been assisting B Company. Nevertheless 
A Company could only progress about 150 meters. One platoon of A 
Company advanced farther than the other two; became engaged with a 
greatly superior forces and was pinned down. Some of the enemy per- 
mitted the friendly to pass by them in the dense terrain and then 
opened up from concealed positions. White phosphorous artillery was 
brought in around the platoon and between the platoon and A Company (-) 
to give support to an A Company move forward to get it. The burning 
phosphorous caused a temporary lull in the enemy firing and that plus 
the smoke, enabled the platoon and their dead and wounded to be reached 
and brought back. A 200 - 225 enemy force was still in the area fight- 
ing against Companies A and B. By 1740 hours, I decided that it was 
necessary to pull A and B Companies, under cover of heavy supporting 
fires, back to the fringe of the landing zone and set up a tight 
defensive perimeter for the night. We were still in good communications with the surrounded platoon and it was ringed with close-in 
artillery defensive fire. My intentions were to conduct another coordinated attack during the night or early the next morning to reach it or 
to get them out during the night by infiltration. Both A and B Companies 
had numerous WIA and KIA to get out of the area of contact; reorganization of the squads and platoons had to be accomplished; resupply 
of ammo and water had to be carried out; and all units of the battalion 
had to be tied in and disposed for the night. C Company had taken a 
heavy toll of the enemy throughout the afternoon. C Company had taken 
a few casualties but was in good shape and the enemy, although still 
in contact, had ceased his attacks on the Company. Company D had gone 
into position. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry was landed in two 
to four UH-1D loads at a time from 1705 to 1800 hours. As they landed 
I built them into a reserve force prepared to counter-attack any pene- 
tration of C Company or for commitment in the A, B Company area of contact. This was not necessary.*