"The Lost Platoon".*
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Date: 14th November 1965*
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Time: 13:40*  
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Mission type: USA extremely cautious advance to pre-defined objectives*
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NVA Units/Formations present on map: 187/65 *
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Map size: Huge (160 x 200)*
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Visibility: 10*
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Turns: 27*
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Lt. Col Hal Moore's After Action Report :*
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C. SECURING OF THE LANDING ZONE AND INITIAL CONTACT :*
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(3) The A Company Commander sent up one platoon to B 
Company as directed. This platoon headed out, became engaged, and 
ended up on the right of B Company rather than the left. This was 
confusing to both the A Company Commander and myself until later 
in the afternoon when the location of this platoon became sorted 
out. The B Company Commander pushed out in an effort to reach his 
platoon which by that time had been completely surrounded. B Company 
(-) plus the A Company platoon was able to get to within 75 meters 
of the cut-off platoon but could get no further. The A Company plat- 
oon made it closer than any other element. B Company was taking mod- 
erate casualties. Concurrently as Company A (-) was heading up to- 
wards the left and rearmost elements of B Company, it made heavy 
contact with a large force of at least one PAVN Company which was 
driving in and along a dry creek bed parallel to the western edge of 
the LZ. These enemy were headed directly towards the left rear of 
Company B. A very heavy fire fight immediately broke out. A Com- 
pany was taking light casualties and extracting a heavy toll from 
the enemy. One of the A Company platoons was in such a position that 
it was able to bring close-in flanking fire on 50 - 70 PAVN as they 
continued moving across their front. Many of them were killed, as 
when the lead few were dropped, the remainder kept coming right into 
the field of fire. A Company took two prisoners who were later evac- 
uated to Brigade.* 
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(4) Just as the A Company fire fight broke out, the last 
elements of C Company and the lead elements of D Company landed. As 
they landed, the helicopters took numerous hits but none were shot down. 
The C Company Commander directed his elements into position along side 
his other elements which had landed previously. Within five minutes, a force 
of 175 - 200 enemy, headed for the LZ, ran headlong into C 
Company. C Company held them off, killing numerous of them in the 
process as they continued trying to get to the landing zone. One 
prisoner was taken and evacuated. The C Company action continued for 
approximately 1 1/2 hours until the enemy, disorganized and decimated, 
pulled off under heavy friendly artillery and air fires, dragging many 
of his dead and wounded.* 
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(5) Concurrent with all of the above, as the first 
elements of D Company landed (with the last elements of C Company), 
they immediately became engaged in the fire fight near A Company. 
One of the D Company Commander's radio operators was KIA in the lift 
Company Commanders helicopter before he could dismount and the door 
gunner and one pilot were wounded. I stopped the other eight UH-1D's 
from landing by radio. The D Company elements consisted of the command 
group, part of the mortar platoon and the antitank platoon. The D 
Company Commander led them towards the sound of the heavy firing in 
the A Company area. They made it to the stream-bed area; immediately 
engaged 25 - 30 PAVN headed down the stream-bed and killed most of 
them. A Company elements killed the rest. During this fight, the 
D Company Commander and Mortar Platoon Leader were seriously wounded 
but continued to fire their rifles personally killing several PAVN. 
After the enemy were stopped, the D Company Commander alternately lost 
consciousness and came to. He turned over the command of the company 
to the Antitank Platoon Sergeant, a Staff Sergeant, E-6. Dispositions 
of units at that time are shown at Tab F. The Commanding Officer, C 
Company made physical contact with this Staff Sergeant and with my 
approval directed the D Company elements to the left of C Company 
tying in tightly around the southeastern edge of the LZ off in the 
brush.*
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(6) By then we were taking numerous casualties through- 
out the battalion, and it was apparent that we were fighting 500 - 600 
enemy. These were only the ones we were in contact with and I figured 
others were headed our way. I requested the Brigade Commander to send 
me another rifle company. He immediately approved this request. In 
fact I later learned that he had already alerted B Company, 2d Battal- 
ion, 7th Cavalry and was assembling it at pick-up zones.*
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(7) During this fire fight, the Cavalry Scout Section was 
given specific areas to reconnoiter. They concentrated on routes of 
egress down the mountain to the northwest and southwest, and also ap- 
proaches from the north and northwest on the valley floor. The Cavalry 
reported results to me on my command net. At this tine, approximately 
1500 hours, I decided that it vas necessary to continue to land the re- 
mainder of the tactical elements of the battalion consisting of the re- 
con platoon, 3 UH1D loads of C Company men, and the XO and 1st Sergeant 
of D Company. Although the eastern portion of the landing zone was under 
enemy fire it had slacked off considerably due to the C and D Company 
actions. These elements landed safely. I turned D Company over to the 
Company XO and directed him to dispose the recon platoon around the 
north and east fringe of the LZ for LZ security and as battalion re- 
serve. The C Company Commander had previously, with my approval, set 
up all rifle Company mortars on the eastern fringe of the LZ. The D 
Company Commander was directed to add his mortars to them and take 
over their control from a central FDC. Principal direction of fire 
was toward A and B Companies. The mortarmen also had the mission of 
LZ defense to their east. All went quickly into position.* 
