"The Long Battle" (Hard difficulty)*
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Date: 14th November 1965*
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Time: 13:40*  
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Mission type: Commander's initiative*
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US Units/Formations/Air strikes present on map: 238/64/31 *
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NVA Units/Formations present on map: 409/137 *
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Map size: Huge (160 x 200)*
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Visibility: 10*
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Turns: 90*
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Lt. Col Hal Moore's After Action Report :*
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IX. COMMENT:*
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A. The following items concerning the enemy and general battle- 
field techniques are considered worthy of mention. Most represent 
nothing new and are listed for emphasis as being particularly applicable 
to the PAVN enemy. *
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B. FIRE SUPPORT: *
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(1) Fire support to be truly effective must be close-in. 
Against heavy attacks such as the ones we defended against, some enemy 
will get very close or even intermingled with friendly in the high 
grass. Bringing fires in promptly, “walking them in” extremely close 
helped us greatly. The commander cannot wait until he knows exactly 
where all his men are. If he does, in a heavy action, he will get 
more men killed by waiting than if he starts shooting immediately. 
Once the enemy gets as close as 25 meters out or intermingled then he 
has the friendly fighting on his terms, with those who have made it 
that close. Close fire support then can be used to cut off his 
follow-up units, and they will be there. He is much more afraid of 
napalm and white phosphorous than HE. He hits the dirt under HE 
fire. Under napalm and WP, he often gets up and runs around in dis 
order, and presents a better target for small arms, VT, and HE. 
The 250 pound frag bomb and the CBO's are very effective.* 
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(2) When a unit gets into an objective area, as soon as 
possible after landing, artillery fires should be brought in. This 
will maybe kill some PAVN nearby and certainly will cut down time on 
when a fire mission on known enemy is called for.*
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(3) Aerial rocket artillery is extremely effective especially 
if the pilots knew the exact location of friendly. It has a tremendous 
shock effect on the enemy. The thing about ARA which makes it at times 
more effective than artillery is the fact that it does not have to be 
seen by ground observers to be adjusted. If the front lines or a friendly 
position is marked and can be recognized by the pilots, quick, accurate 
fire support is the result. *
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(4) The LAW was effective against the anthills behind 
which the PAVN were hiding. Training on use of LAWS must be emphasized.*
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(5) If PAVN are encountered close-in during a friendly 
attack, the best solution to an attack may be to back up under artillery 
and ARA, let the artillery and ARA work the area over and then start 
again, loading off with plenty of M-79s in the trees and grass and LAWS 
into the anthills.*
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(6) Whenever illumination was in the air many of the enemy 
ceased firing. *
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(7) Careful placement of M-79 men should be emphasized in 
order to give them the best possible fields of fire. They must always 
be on the lookout for enemy in trees. It was found that the M-79's 
were extremely affective against enemy in trees as well as troops in 
the open. M-79's must be fired into trees and the high grass even when 
no enemy are seen.*
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(8) In this operation all mortars were combined under a 
central FDC. This was very satisfactory. The mortars were very effect- 
ive. Mortar illumination firing was carefully controlled at battalion 
level. The mortar illumination round has a very high dud rate and it 
would take many rounds to provide a battalion perimeter illumination 
for one hour. Therefore it was used to fill the gap for illumination 
between the artillery and the flareship. The mortars alone could not 
have come close to providing the desired amount of illumination.*
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(9) Artillery. TAC Air, and ARA can be used at the same 
time without loss of aircraft or effectiveness. The ARA and TAC Air 
flow perpendicular to the artillery gun-target line in these cases 
where they simultaneously struck the same target areas. Other striking 
aircraft flew parallel to the gun-target line and beyond it. This called 
for close teamwork between the FAC and the artillery liaison officer.*
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(10) Artillery must be used against possible avenues of 
reinforcement as well as on the enemy in either an attack or a defense. 
Close-in continuous defensive H and I fires are a must in a defensive 
situation where the enemy is known to be present even if he is not 
attacking.*
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(11) Great emphasis should be placed on the ability of all 
personnel down to and including fire team leaders to adjust artillery 
and mortar fire.*
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(12) Each platoon must carry many colored smoke grenades 
and a panel for marking friendly lines and landing areas.*
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(13) The technique of having all units on the perimeter 
throw a colored smoke grenade on order greatly helped TAC Air and 
ARA to locate the perimeter.*
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C. MOVEMENT *
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(1) Movement must be cautiously aggressive. The enemy 
must be pinned down by fire. Small unit, squad sized fire and move- 
ment must be conducted to perfection. This is extremely important. 
If not conducted correctly, men will get hit and the problem is then 
compounded when other men stop firing to try to recover casualties. 
Then they also get hit in many cases and soon, combat effectiveness of 
the squad, platoon, etc. is in danger of being lost. In this connection, 
when enemy contact has been made or is strongly suspected, recon by fire 
or actual fire and movement should be conducted to forestall the enemy 
firing first. This is particularly important for a unit moving up along- 
side a unit which is in contact and in a fire fight.*
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(2) Platoon and company fire and maneuver must be con- 
ducted to perfection. Flanks must be secure. Open flanks can be 
secured to a degree by fire support. Squads and platoons must be tied 
together as close as the situation permits. The tighter the better 
against the PAVN, as he will hole up in concealed firing positions, let 
friendly go by, then open up.*
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(3) Close-in artillery. ARA, and TAC Air front, rear, and 
both sides is a great help in moving through an area where there are 
known enemy. This normal but sometimes overlooked.*
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(4) When companies conduct sweep and clear operations 
together out of a perimeter, or even a certain route, battalion must 
check on the company formations to be used to insure that the terrain 
will be adequately covered and the companies are properly coordinated 
and fitted to the terrain and the enemy situation.*
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D. TECHNIQUES:*
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(1) The technique of holding a company (-) as an offensive 
striking force while recon elements of one platoon check specific areas 
out 50-100 meters from the landing zone worked out very veil in this 
case. For one thing until the assault unit is actually on the ground 
and sees and feels the terrain and the environment, the commander of 
the unit charged with LZ security does not finally know which areas he 
will check out in priority. Also and most important, the assembled 
company (-) enables the battalion commander to hit any enemy attack 
quickly with a controlled unit. In this operation we were also able 
to move quickly with Company B to develop the contact made by one 
of its platoons as soon as Company A had sufficient force to take over 
the LZ security mission. In retrospect, the fact that Company B was 
in a posture for a fast move off the landing zone undoubtedly gave us 
the jump on the PAVN. Had not B Company surprised them with their 
aggressive move up the finger, we might well have been fighting the 
PAVN from the fringes of the LZ with our backs on it -- and the enemy 
in turn would have had good fields of fire on the incoming helicopters 
carrying the last elements of A Company and all of C and D Companies. 
I feel that the fact that we had first B Company, then A Company, off 
the landing zone moving against the PAVN, then C Company in a good block- 
ing position took the initiative away from him. From then on, for three 
days and two nights, he was reacting to our presence.*
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(2) At night, units must form tight perimeters, use Claymore 
mines, trip flares and dig in. The use of outposts and listening posts 
depends largely on the terrain and the enemy situation. In this operation, 
it would have been suicidal as the cover and concealment afforded the 
enemy too many opportunities to take the outguards by stealth. Camou- 
flaged foxholes with cleared fields of fire are recommended. Normal, but 
sometimes hard to execute under fire.*
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(3) In a perimeter defense, it is necessary to check the 
front with small recon parties at first light and periodically through 
the day for 100-200 meters to clear out infiltrators, police the battle- 
field, and to insure that the enemy is not massing for an attack. This 
action should be preceded by having all troops on the perimeter spray the 
trees, grass, and anthills to their front and overhead at a specified 
time for two-three minutes. When the recon elements screen to the 
front, it should be preceded by artillery and recon by fire, Air Cav 
Scouts overhead can assist by observation. Units should move as in 
the attack with fire and movement. All men must give the enemy the 
capability of being to the front and overhead as infiltrators, snipers, 
or massing for an attack.*
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(4) The battalion command group must carry a 292 antenna 
in on the assault and set it up as soon as possible. D Company, my 
alternate CP, carried one in on the assault -- set it up, and it 
was invaluable.*
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E. SUPPLY, SUPPORT, SERVICES:*
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(1) The minimum amount of gear should be carried into 
an assault. This should be one meal, a poncho, two canteens of water, 
salt tablets, and plenty of ammunition.*
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(2) Casualties are a critical problem. When fire is 
pinning down individuals, one casualty will cost one or two more men 
attempting to get to him. Heavy cover fire must be employed to try 
and cover the attempt to recover the wounded man and get him out of 
the danger area. Leaders at all levels in contact under fire must act 
cautiously in getting casualties out. I lost many leaders killed and 
wounded while recovering casualties. Wounded must be pulled back to 
some type of covered position and then treated. Troops must not get so 
concerned with casualties that they forget the enemy and their mission. 
Attempting to carry a man out requires up to four men as bearers which 
can hurt a unit at a critical time.*
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(3) Evacuation of casualties from the areas of contact 
in this action was a problem. TO&E litter bearers would have been a 
big help. As it turned out, fighting strength had to be used to 
carry out a wounded man (3-4 men required) or to assist many walking 
wounded. (one man at least required in many cases).*
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(4) When a man is wounded or killed, his weapon and some 
of his equipment get separated from him in many cases. An S-4 represent- 
ative - officer or NCO with assistants, must be present at least in 
the battalion forward aid station and at the collecting company at 
Forward Support. Some of our equipment was evacuated with men all 
the way to Qui Nhon. Also we had many M-16's shot up and had to 
have replacements in the area. Therefore we kept a lot of weapons 
in the battle area for re-issue. When we were pulled out we brought 
all excess weapons and equipment with us. Many enemy weapons which 
were captured and sent out with friendly KIA and WIA were never seen 
again. The unit commander fighting the battle in the objective area 
loses control of equipment, friendly and enemy, once it leaves the 
forward area by helicopter. A more effective "backstop" system must 
be set up to catch this gear and control it when it arrives at various 
unloading points in the rear.*
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(5) Rations are no problem. Few men eat much when in a 
heavy action; however, water is extremely critical. It must be present 
in quantitity particularly when there is no stream source available.*
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(6)The pathfinder team was tremendous. Until they could 
get in around 1630 hours, 14 November, all incoming aircraft had to be 
guided in and out by the battalion commander on the battalion command 
net. A pathfinder team should go into every battalion-sized assault.*
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(7) It took time to reload M-16 magazines one round at 
a time. In the heavy action we encountered, this took excessive time 
at critical periods. It was particularly critical during the enemy night 
attack. Also it was difficult to keep track of empty magazines in 
a heavy fire fight. The solution may be an expendable, plastic type 
magazine which is resupplied to the rifleman fully loaded in a bandoleer 
as was the old M-l clip of eight rounds. Also, the present M-14 ammo 
pouch makes crawling on the stomach difficult. *
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(8) The individual soldier must become at least as good 
as the PAVN in camouflage techniques and use of terrain and foliage 
to cover and conceal his movements. This must be emphasized.*
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F. THE PAVN ENEMY:*
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(1) He appeared to be well-trained. He was aggressive. 
He was equipped with a preponderance of automatic weapons and plenty of 
ammunition. He carried 3-5 Chinese potato masher hand grenades. He 
carried a Softball-sized wad of cooked rice, most of them carried a 
bed roll consisting of a piece of waterproof plastic and a hammock. 
His weapons were well maintained.*
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(2) He was an expert at camouflage and used every bit of 
cover and concealment to perfection. With only small arms, mortars, 
and antitank weapons he obviously sought to close with us in strength 
quickly-before we could discover him - possibly to render our fire support 
less effective and certainly to overwhelm us and force us to fight on 
his terms. Without much overhead fire support, he probably has to fall 
back on expert camouflage techniques, attacks in mass, infiltrators, and 
stay-behind killer parties.*
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(3) He was a deadly shot. In caring for my men who had 
been killed and wounded, I was struck by the great number who had been 
shot in the head and upper part of the body -- particularly in the head. 
He definitely aimed for the leaders -- the men who were shouting, pointing, 
talking on radios. Be also aimed for the men carrying radios. He also 
appeared to concentrate on men wearing insignia of rank -- particularly 
non-commissioned officer with stripes on their arms. In this war, I 
question if it is necessary, possibly even foolish, or inviting fire, 
for non-commissioned officers to wear insignia of their grade -- 
or any unlisted man for that matter. Within the small units, all men 
know their leaders. In base camp the leaders should wear their insignia. 
On operations against the enemy, they should wear clean-sleeve fatigues.*
