"SECURING OF THE LANDING ZONE AND INITIAL CONTACT".*
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Date: 14th November 1965*
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Time: 12:00 *
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Mission type: USA advance to pre-defined objectives*
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NVA Units/Formations present on map: 51/19 *
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Map size: Huge (160 x 200)*
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Visibility: 10*
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Turns: 22*
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Lt. Col Hal Moore's After Action Report :*
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C. SECURING OF THE LANDING ZONE AND INITIAL CONTACT :*
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The B Company Commander was directed to intensify his reconnaissance in the area 
where the prisoner had been taken (near the mountain), and to prepare 
to assume the C Company mission of searching the lower portion of 
the mountain area with emphasis on the finger and draw to the north- 
west. My command chopper was called in and the prisoner was taken 
back immediately for interrogation at the Brigade CP. By then, 1210 
hours, sufficient elements of Company A had landed (unopposed) to 
take over the LZ security mission from Company B, Also elements of 
the reconnoitering platoon of B Company had made contact with 
scattered enemy riflemen near the mountain. The B Company Commander was 
ordered to assume the C Company searching mission; to move up the 
finger loading down towards X-RAY; and to develop the situation. B 
Company moved out and I directed the commander of A Company to prepare 
to move up into the same area on order when Company C had arrived in 
X-RAY in sufficient strength to take over LZ security. At that time, 1230 
hours we were taking no fire in the LZ. Around 1245 hours, lead elements of Company B began to engage in a fire fight of moderate intensity. Shortly afterwards at approximately 1330 hours, Commanding 
Officer, Company B reported that he was being attacked heavily by at 
least two companies of enemy and that his right platoon was in danger 
of being surrounded and cut off from the rest of the company by a 
numerically superior force. The fire fight became intense. Also a 
few rounds of 60 and 81 mm mortar fire began falling in the LZ and on 
B Company. B Company also received some rocket fire.* 
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(2) Shortly after the heavy fire fight began, the last 
platoon of A Company and the Company Commander and lead elements of 
C Company landed. The Commanding Officer, Company A was ordered to 
move his company up on the left of B Company; to establish physical 
contact with it; to protect the B Company left flank; and to send 
one platoon up to B Company to assist B Company in getting to the 
B Company platoon which was in danger of being cut off. The Command- 
ing Officer, Company C was ordered to take up a blocking position off 
the landing zone to the south and southwest to prevent the LZ from 
being overrun from that direction, and to give protection to A Company's 
left flank. I called the S-3 in the command chopper and told him to 
have my Forward Air Controller bring in air strikes beginning on the 
lover fringe of the mountain foothills and work over the mountain and 
enemy approaches to the LZ from the west and south in that priority. 
The same instructions were to be given to the ARA and to the artillery. 
Priority of fires were to go to fire missions and requests from 
companies. When not firing in response to a specific request, fires 
were to be poured in as directed above. The Company Commanders, 
forward observers, the forward air controller, and the artillery 
Liaison officer were all having difficulty getting coordinated as to 
the locations of the forward elements of the companies. There were 
no well-defined terrain features to help and the scrub and trees all 
looked alike. The air was heavy with smoke and dust. B Company had 
more problems than any other company since it had one platoon separ- 
ated from the rest of the company in the jungle, and could not preci- 
sely pin point its location for purposes of close-in fire support. 
The platoon was in a moving fire-fight against a force of 75-100 enemy. 
The fact that this platoon was forward of B and A Companies delayed 
delivery of effective fires in support of these two companies. How- 
ever, using the technique of "walking" fires down the mountain from 
the south and west, fires were placed where they gave some help to 
these two companies - especially Company A. I specifically defined 
several draws loading down from the mountain, and wanted fires placed 
on enemy mortar positions sighted or suspected out to 81 mm mortar 
range. Two air strikes were also brought in on the valley floor to 
the northwest on and near the location of the suspected enemy battal- 
ion reported by higher headquarters the previous day. At this point, 
the most critical period of the afternoon began. 
